National or international Audits that provide assessments of quality and/or safety of beef and veal have been conducted since 1991. All of the Audits listed in Table 1 were funded by the Cattlemen’s Beef Board. Except for the International Beef Quality—1994 (administered by U.S. Meat Export Federation), all of the Audits listed in Table 1 were administered by the Beef Quality Assurance Advisory Board of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association.

The first National Beef Quality Audit was conducted in 1991 and was in response to a series of events that occurred in 1989 through early 1991: (a) Schuh/Johnson Report (1989), which concluded that because the price of beef (relative to that of alternative meats) and real (inflation-adjusted) consumer incomes had accounted for 97% of the decline (from 1978 to 1988) in beef demand, beef production costs had to be reduced. (b) Ron Ward Analysis (1990), which concluded that because the price of beef was responsible for 93% of beef’s loss of market-share, the cost of producing beef had to be reduced. (c) Lambert’s Report On Comparative Prices Per Serving (1991), which demonstrated that comparative average U.S. cost per serving for beef was 32%, 184% and 212% higher than for pork, turkey and chicken, respectively. (d) Lambert’s Lost Opportunities In Beef Production (1991), which suggested that beef could be priced lower at the consumer level if cattlemen recaptured the $11.999 billion of lost economic opportunities each year because, in part, of hot-iron branding, carcass/offal condemnations, bruises, injection-site lesions, abscesses, too light/too heavy carcasses, carcasses grading lower than U.S. Select, dark-cutting beef, carcasses of Yield Grades 4 and 5, excess fat due to over- finishing of cattle and excess fat because of inappropriate decision-making at the time of marketing.

Results of the National Beef Quality Audit—1991 identified as the most important actions needed by those in the beef industry to improve the consistency and competitiveness of fed-beef: (1) Attack Waste, (2) Enhance Taste, (3) Improve Management and (4) Control Weight. The costs to the U.S. beef industry of nonconformities in these items are included in Table 2.

Between the time of the release of results of the National Beef Quality Audit—1991 and the time of the Strategy Workshop of the National Beef Quality Audit—1995, it became increasingly evident that a “Mid-Course Correction” was needed in the “amount of waste” (trimmable fat) that could be removed from cattle/carcasses without negatively affecting productivity, reproductive capacity and quality—especially as “quality” relates to the amount of marbling. The “Mid-Course Correction” was described in the Final Report of the National Beef Quality Audit—1995 by saying: (a) In the first Audit, we overestimated the amount of fat that we will ever be able to remove from high quality cattle and carcasses. (b) Expected returns from removing excess fat ($189.78 in NBQA—1991) were so much of the total ($279.82) that could, potentially, be recovered, that producers became obsessed with removing excess fat from their cattle. (c) As a result, producers didn’t work to correct any of the taste, management or weight problems; and, consequentially, little or no progress in the U.S. beef industry was being made on things—little things, they thought—like brands and bruises and tough steaks that are too big. (d) Attempting to achieve “zero fat” is unrealistic; production practices and palatability concerns both dictate that some fat is necessary. (e) At the Strategy Workshop for the NBQA—1995, “Attack Waste” baseline targets were set at 16.5% of carcass weight as fat, 15.0% of carcass weight as bone, and 68.5% of carcass weight as red meat. (f) Using NBQA—1995 data, average carcass weight was 747.9 pounds with 20.4% (152.57 pounds) of total trimmable fat; at a new target of 16.5% fat (123.4 pounds), there would be 29.17 pounds of excess fat worth $27.42 ($1.07 per pound carcass value minus $0.13 per pound fat-credit value). (g) Target Yield Grades at the 16.5/15.0/68.5, fat/bone/red meat endpoint are: 2.1 for Select, 1.8 for Low Choice, 1.6 for Upper Two-Thirds Choice and 1.2 for Prime.

A comparison of results for the NBQA—1991 and the NBQA—1995, using the logic and prices of the 1991 NBQA, yielded the results illustrated in Table 3.

Results described in Table 3 reveal that those in the beef industry had accomplished improvements in Waste and Weight, but not in Taste or Management, in the four years between these two Audits. The net effect of changes made in improving the consistency and competitiveness of the fed-beef supply was $3.23 for each steer/heifer harvested in the U.S. (Table 3). When the effect of the Mid-Course Correction and new (1995) logic and prices were used to compute quality losses and when nomenclature was changed (“Attack Waste” became “Increase Red Meat Yield” and “Enhance Taste” became “Enhance Taste And Tenderness”), the results of the National Beef Quality Audit—1995 (Table 4) revealed that the potential for improvement of quality of fed-beef was $137.82 per steer/heifer.

In both the 1991 and 1995 National Beef Quality Audits, computations of value losses were usually objective but sometimes subjective. Assessments of quality losses due to management errors (branding, bruising, failure to dehorn, failure to prevent damage from parasites and disease that result in condemnations, etc.) were quantifiable; so were problems resulting from genetic or production management mistakes that resulted in carcass nonconformities (bullock, B maturity, dark-cutter, blood splash, U.S. Standard, too light/too heavy carcasses, excessively fat carcasses, carcasses with too small/too large ribeyes). Occurrences of those quality defects were determined using results obtained during Phase II activities of the Audits and the cost of each defect was determined by experts in the field. Examples of how such quality losses were computed in the National Beef Quality Audits of 1991 and 1995 are presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.

Other cost estimates, though, were made by experts who were not able to depend on traits quantified by the Audit results; examples of those were the “best estimates” of Robert Koeppen (The Blueside Companies) for losses in hide value due to the effects of mud, urine, feces, insects and parasites and that of Dr. Brad Morgan (Texas A&M University; Colorado State University; Oklahoma State University) for losses due to palatability deficiencies. For example, Dr. Morgan’s logic in 1991 for the value loss associated with toughness was made by contacting retailers and food-service operators to determine incidences of refunds to patrons who complained about toughness of beef plus the occurrence of Bos indicus influenced cattle in the slaughter mixes of packers who provided such data to him; results of his assessment in the National Beef Quality Audit—1991 are presented in Table 7. In 1995, Dr. Morgan used his estimates from NBQA—1991 plus results of the National Beef Tenderness Survey (Morgan et al., 1991) and of the National Beef Tenderness Conference (National Cattlemen’s Association, 1994) to determine “How much does beef toughness cost?” (Table 8).

Suffice it to say, though, that the estimates of the value of quality losses in slaughter steers/heifers was made in the most scientific way that was possible. And, for “Enhance Taste” or “Enhance Taste And Tenderness” in the 1991 and 1995 National Beef Quality Audits, cooler assessments performed in Phase II of each of those Audits were used to quantify the costs of failure to produce carcasses of the desired USDA Quality Grade mixes. The manner in which such losses were calculated in the National Beef Quality Audit—1995 is illustrated in Table 9.

During Face-To-Face Interviews (Phase I) of the National Beef Quality Audits of 1991 and 1995, the top-ten producer-controllable concerns about beef quality were ascertained. Opinions of purveyors, restaurateurs and retailers were aggregated (Table 10) while those of packers were not (Table 11). From 1991 to 1995: (a) Excess external fat dropped from 1st to 4th, (b) Injection-site lesions dropped from 2nd to 9th, (c) Excess weight/box dropped from 3rd to 7th, (d) Excess seam went off the list, (e) Low overall cutability dropped from 6th to 10th, (f) Dark cutters went off the list, and (g) Bruise damage went off the list—based on the composite of opinions of purveyors, restaurateurs and retailers (Table 10). Those end-users: (a) Increased the rank of low uniformity and consistency (from 5th, up to 1st), (b) Increased the rank of low overall palatability (from 8th, up to 3rd) and (c) Replaced old (1991) quality concerns with new ones—inadequate tenderness (2nd), price too high for value received (5th), insufficient flavor (6th) and inappropriate Quality Grade mix (8th).

From 1991 to 1995: (a) Hide problems (as a general category) dropped from 1st to 3rd and tied-for-9th (as specific concerns for mud/manure and brands), (b) Injection-site lesions went off the list, (c) Excessive weights (as carcasses) dropped from 3rd to 7th (as cattle), (d) Reduced quality due to use of implants went off the list and (e) Bruise damage and insufficient marbling did not change—based on the opinions of packers (Table 11). Packers: (a) Increased the rank of lack of uniformity (from 9th, up to 1st), (b) Increased the rank of excessive external fat (from 8th as Too Many Yield Grades 4 and 5, to tied for 4th as Excessive External Fat), (c) Increased the rank of liver condemnations (from 6th, to 2nd), (d) Increased the rank of dark cutters (from 10th, to tied for 4th) and (e) Added “Beef’s price is too high for the value received” to their list.

During the Strategy Workshop of the National Beef Quality Audit—1991, guests/participants identified the “Top Fifteen Quality Concerns Of The Beef Industry” as: (1) Low overall uniformity of beef, (2) Excessive external fat, (3) Low overall uniformity of live cattle, (4) Price too high for the value received, (5) Excessive seam fat, (6) Low overall palatability, (7) Inadequate tenderness, (8) Low overall cutability, (9) Insufficient marbling, (10) Too frequent hide problems, (11) Too high incidence of injection-site lesions, (12) Excessive weights of cuts and boxes of cuts, (13) Excessive live/carcass weights, (14) Inadequate understanding of the value of closer-trimmed beef, and (15) Too large ribeyes/loin eyes. During the Strategy Workshop of the National Beef Quality Audit—1995, the response/reaction/ consensus panel identified the “Top Ten Quality Concerns of The Beef Industry” as: (1) Low overall uniformity and consistency, (2) Low overall palatability, (3) Insufficient marbling, (4) Inadequate tenderness, (5) Excessive external, seam and beef-trim fat, (6) Excessive weights of cuts and boxes of cuts, (7) Too high incidence of injection-site lesions, (8) Beef’s price is too high for the value received, (9) Excessive live and carcass weights, and (10) Too frequent hide problems.

Participants at the Strategy Workshop of the National Beef Quality Audit—1991 determined that the ten best Strategies for “Improving The Consistency And Competitiveness of Fed-Beef” were these: (1) Encourage Quarter-Inch As The New “Commodity” Fat-Trim Specification For Beef Primals/Subprimals; (2) Change Live-To-Carcass Price Logic—From The Present “Dressing Percentage” (Untrimmed Carcass Weight divided by Live Weight times 100) To A New “Red Meat Yield” (Weight Of Carcass Trimmed To Quarter-Inch Fat Trim divided by Live Weight times 100); (3) Keep The “Heat” On Communicating Cutability To Retailers And Packers By Improving Understanding Of The Value Of Closer-Trimmed Beef; (4) Go After, And Correct, Management Practices That Create Nonconformity; (5) Eliminate Biological Types Of Cattle (Not Breeds per se) That Fail To Conform; (6) Institute Quality-Based Marketing; (7) Identify Outlier-Values (Ribeye, Too Large Or Too Small; Marbling, Too Low; Weight, Too Heavy Or Too Light; Etc.) For Carcass Traits To Facilitate Meeting Of Targeted Outcomes; (8) Design And Conduct The Strategic Alliance Field Studies (“Partnering Between Cow/Calf Producers, Feeders, Packers, Retailers and Purveyors As Demonstrations Of Functional Integration Based On Total Quality Management Principles—A Proposal Approved In Principle By The NCA Industry Information Committee); (9) Use The National Beef Carcass Data Collection Program (Plus DNA Fingerprinting And Determination Of Shear Force Requirements) To Identify Superior Seedstock; and (10) Repeat The National Beef Quality Audit At Periodic Intervals To Assess Progress And Identify New Opportunities For Improvements In Consistency And Competitiveness Of Beef.

Members of the Response/Reaction/Consensus Panel—at the Strategy Workshop of the National Beef Quality Audit—1995 decided that the eight best Strategies for Improving The Quality, Consistency, Competitiveness And Market-Share Of Beef were: (1) Assist Producers To Use Selection And Management Techniques To Produce Cattle That Fit Customer Expectations For Marbling, Red Meat Yield And Weight; (2) Establish Close-Trimmed Beef As The Industry Standard; (3) Develop A Cattle Identification System That Facilitates Data Collection And Information Feedback, And That Reduces Reliance On Hot-Iron Branding; (4) Encourage Development Of Cattle Pricing Systems That Accurately Identify And Reward Production Of Cattle With Zero Defects; (5) Encourage Development Of Cattle Pricing Systems That Identify, Categorize And Price Product Attributes That Affect Consumer Satisfaction; (6) Continue To Discover, Develop And Apply Technology To Enhance The Quality Of Beef; (7) Identify Breeding Systems That Optimize Production, Palatability and Profitability; and (8) Identify Procedures To Facilitate Improved Customer Satisfaction And Loyalty To The Beef Eating Experience. The Response/Reaction/Consensus Panel at the Strategy Workshop of the National Beef Quality Audit—1995 also identified thirteen Tactics for “Improving The Quality, Consistency, Competitiveness And Market Share Of Beef,” but Tactics were not identified as a part of the National Beef Quality Audit—1991.